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"No one [should] be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to
take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his
own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime."l

INTRODucnON

In recent years, two women stood convicted of highly publi
cized major crimes in Massachusetts. Katherine Ann Power
("Power") was a fugitive who committed felony-murder in 1970.
She led a life on the run as a fugitive until 1993 when she revealed
* Sean Kealy is Legal Counsel for the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice for
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He was formerly an Assistant Attorney General
assigned to the Division of Victim Compensation and Assistance within the Massachu
setts Office of the Attorney General's Family and Community Crimes Bureau. The
opinions within this paper are Mr. Kealy's and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Attorney General's Office or the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice. The author
thanks Susan Kealy, Stacey G. Bloom, Noelle Byrnes, Diane Juliar, Judy Beals, Carolyn
Keshian, and Michael Harris for their assistance in writing and revising this Article.
1. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 119 (1991) (quoting Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188,190 (N.Y. 1889)).
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her true identity and surrendered to authorities to face the conse
quences of her crimes. 2 Louise Woodward ("Woodward"), an au
pair originally from England, gained notoriety on both sides of the
Atlantic Ocean when she was convicted of killing the baby en
trusted to her care. 3 Both women captured the attention of the na
tional media for months and reportedly had opportunities to sell
their images, stories, and opinions for huge amounts of money.4
The court system, however, dealt with these infamous defendants in
two drastically different ways. In the Power case, the sentencing
judge made it a specific condition of her probation that she could
never profit from her crime. 5 Woodward's sentence, by contrast,
did not include any conditions to keep her from profiting from her
notoriety.6 A lesson to be learned from the differential handling of
these cases is that Massachusetts needs a law that specifically ad
dresses whether and to what extent a criminal may profit from his
or her heinous, albeit sensational, crimes. A notoriety-for-profit
law7 would provide a means of regulating these high profile situa
tions in a manner that consistently protects the rights of people
whose victimizers have become media stars.

2. See Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Mass. 1995). Power became
involved in radical activities while a student at Brandeis University. See Shaun B. Spen
cer, Note, Does Crime Pay-Can Probation Stop Katherine Ann Power from Selling Her
Story?, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1203, 1205 (1994). She and several other activists planned to
rob a bank to help fund the Black Panthers. See id. at 1205-06. On September 23,
1970, Power drove the get-away car while three accomplices robbed the State Street
Bank & Trust Co. in Brighton, Mass., and a fourth accomplice sat outside the bank as a
lookout. See Power, 650 N.E.2d at 88. Tho Boston Police officers responded to a silent
alarm triggered in the bank. See id. As one of the officers entered the bank, he was
fatally shot in the back by the lookout. See id. All of the defendant's accomplices were
apprehended-three within a short period of time and the fourth several years later.
See id. Power, however, settled in Oregon under an assumed name and successfully
avoided apprehension for over twenty years. See id. In September 1993, she finally
surrendered to the Massachusetts authorities. See id. at 88-89.
3. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (Mass. 1998).
4. See Carol Midgley, No Deal Will Be Struck on Story Until After Appeal, Times
(London), Nov. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9242321. Before her conviction, Wood
ward had been offered £50,000 by the Daily Mail contingent upon her acquittal. See id.
Lord Rothermere, chairman of the Daily Mail and General Trust, defended the offer by
saying, "if you pay convicted people for their story it enables the victim to sue for
compensation." Id. For a discussion on Power's opportunities to cash in on her crime
see Greater Boston (WGBH television broadcast, Nov. 17,1997).
5. See Power, 650 N.E.2d at 89.
6. See David Talbot, Nanny Goes Free; Big Unknown: Will Woodward Profit from
Case?, BOSTON HERALD, June 17, 1998, at 10.
7. See infra Part LA for a discussion of notoriety-for-profit laws.
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Over the last twenty years, over 40 states8 and the federal gov
ernment9 have passed legislation to prevent offenders from profit
ing from their crimes. These notoriety-for-profit or "Son of Sam"l0
laws serve two important governmental purposes: (1) they prevent
criminals from profiting from their wrongdoing and (2) they com
pensate crime victims.ll However, in 1991, in Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.,12 the
United States Supreme Court found the first Son of Sam law ever
passed unconstitutional.13 Because the New York law was a model
for many other states, including Massachusetts, all Son of Sam stat
utes have since been reexamined for similar flaws. 14 Massachusetts'
own Son of Sam statute was repealed.15 The Victim's Compensa
tion statute that followed resolved the constitutional problem by
wholly eliminating a notoriety provision from its text.1 6 However,
the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and the Massachu
setts Office of Victim Assistance have filed a new Son of Sam bill
with the legislature that provides a constitutional and effective pro
cess for protecting the rights of victims.17
The first part of this Article will examine the history of Son of
Sam statutes, including the genesis of the original New York stat
ute, and the Simon & Schuster decision that ultimately invalidated
the statute. Part I will also examine possible methods of creating a
constitutional Son of Sam statute. Part II discusses whether a Son
of Sam law is necessary or desirable from a legal and policy stand
point. Part III examines the various proposals to replace the Son of
Sam statute in Massachusetts in the wake of Simon & Schuster and
further provides a detailed description of the notoriety-for-profit
bill currently pending before the Massachusetts Legislature. Fi
nally, this Article concludes that Massachusetts should have a Son
8. See infra note 36 for a complete list of states that have passed Son of Sam
statutes since 1977.
9. See 18 U.S.c. § 3681 (1994).
10. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the origin of the term "Son of Sam" law.
11. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118-19 (1991).
12. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
13. See ill. at 123.
14. See infra Part I.C.l for a discussion of how various states have amended their
Son of Sam laws in an effort to ensure their constitutionality.
15. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8, repealed by St.1993, ch. 478, § 3
(eff. Jan. 1, 1995).
16. See ill. ch. 258C (West Supp. 1999).
17. See infra Part I1I.B for a discussion of the current "Son of Sam" statute pend
ing in the Massachusetts Legislature.
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of Sam statute to protect victims, that an effective and constitu
tional bill is possible, and that the pending legislation meets these
criteria and thus should be enacted.
I.

A.

SON OF SAM STATUTES

Genesis of the Son of Sam Statute

The idea of a notoriety-for-profit law came about in 1977.
During the summer of that year, David Berkowitz ("Berkowitz")
terrorized New York City with a series of random shootings that
resulted in six deaths and left seven people severely injured. Is
Originally referred to by the media as the ".44 Caliber Killer," due
to the type of weapon he used to commit his crimes, Berkowitz
quickly became known by a new alias that appeared in a note left at
a crime scene. 19 The note read in part, "I am a monster. I am the
Son of Sam."20 Soon after his capture, Berkowitz had opportunities
to profit from his notoriety by selling the rights to his story.21 Not
surprisingly, the possibility of Berkowitz gaining financially from
his murders appalled most people. 22 Still, the media was willing to
buy the rights to Berkowitz's recollections and memoirs, suggesting
that there would be a significant market for the story.23 Conse
quently, an outraged New York State Legislature24 rushed legisla
tion through which prohibited Berkowitz, or any other criminal,
18. See Lee Lescaze, Berkowitz Pleads Guilty in "Son of Sam" Murders, WASH.
POST, May 9, 1978, at AI.
19. See Sam Roberts, Criminals, Authors, and Criminal Authors, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1987, § 7, at 1 (providing background on Berkowitz and the original Son of
Sam law).
20. Id.
21. See In Re Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (1979) (indicating that Berkowitz's
conservator obtained a contract with McGraw-Hill Book Company to publish his story
with an advance of $250,000 and with estimated royalties to exceed that amount).
22. See Wade Lambert & Stephen Wermiel, Curbs Upheld on Criminals' Book
Profits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1990, at B11 (providing background on New York's Son of
Sam law).
23. See Adam R. Tschom, Beyond Son of Sam, 17 VT. L. REv. 321,324 & n.12
(1992); Kathleen M. Timmons, Note, Natural Born Writers: The Law's Continued An
noyance with Criminal Authors, 29 GA. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1995); New York Approves
Bill Revising "Son of Sam" Law, WALL ST. J., July 6,1992, at 17.
24. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105,108-09 (1991) (quoting Senator Emanuel R. Gold, the notoriety-for
profit law's author, who wrote: "[i]t is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency
that an individual ... can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once he is
captured-while five people are dead, [and] other people were injured as a result of his
conduct") (citation omitted).
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from profiting from his or her crime. 25
This unprecedented law created new duties for the Crime Vic
tims Compensation Board of New York ("Board").26 The Board
was now responsible for reviewing all contracts entered into by
criminal defendants and could seize all proceeds earned as a result
of any re-enactment of the criminal's activities or "thoughts, feel
ings, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime. "27 As such, any
contract entered into with a person accused or convicted of a crime
had to be submitted to the Board for review if it related to the re
enactment of the crime.28 Under the statute, a person convicted of
a crime was broadly defined as any individual convicted of a crime
at trial or following the entry of a plea of guilty, as well as "any
person who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commis
sion of a crime for which such person is not prosecuted."29
Although the statute did not entirely prohibit a criminal from con
tracting to sell his or her story, the law required that monies related
to that contract be maintained by the Board in an escrow account,
and that those monies be distributed to the crime victims when a
civil judgment was obtained against the criminal defendant. 3D
Crime victims had five years to bring a civil action to recover a
money judgment against criminal defendants or their represent a
tives. 31 As such, the Board was required to publish legal notices of
the contracts to potential victims in the county where the crime
took place every six months for five years. 32
Thus, within a few years of his crimes, the Son of Sam alias was
associated not only with Berkowitz, but also with a new class of
statutes-Son of Sam laws. 33 Although relatively few crimes can
command the public attention that Berkowitz's did, making it seem
unlikely that a Son of Sam law would be necessary,34 a law that
25. See In Re Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 906 ("Section 632-a of the Executive Law
[was] conceived in haste, written in haste, and' declared under the cry of the public for
the Legislature to exact retribution ....").
26. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 622 (McKinney 1996).
27. Id. § 632-a(1), repealed by L. 1992, ch. 618, § 10 (eff. July 24, 1992).
28. See id.
29. Id. § 632-a(10)(b).
30. See id. § 632-a(1).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Ironically, the statute was never applied to Berkowitz. See Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 111 (1991)
(stating that Berkowitz was found incompetent to stand trial and, at the time, the New
York statute only applied to criminals who had actually been convicted).
34. See id. (noting that the Son of Sam law had been invoked only a handful of
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combined crime, notoriety, and money was extremely popular with
both legislators and voters. 35 After the creation of the New York
statute, nearly every state, including Massachusetts, passed similar
legislation. 36
times); see also Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and Press
Clauses, 70 N.C. L. REv. 493, 505 & n.73 (1992) (stating that in most jurisdictions
outside of New York few cases have been brought under "Son of Sam" statutes).
35. See Orly Nosrati, Note and Comment, Son of Sam Laws: Killing Free Speech
or Promoting Killer Profits?, 20 WHITTIER L. REv. 949, 952 (1999) (noting popularity
among state legislatures and the public at large); Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform

and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure Equitable Doctrine Be Revived to Dent the
Litigation Crisis?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 53, 106 n.259 (1995) (noting popularity among
the public and state legislatures); Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien, Simon and
Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment
Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1075,1075-76 (1991) (listing statutes from forty
three state legislatures and the federal government that dealt with such profits); Angela
Cartwright, Note, Crime Doesn't Pay: Authors and Publishers Cannot Profit from a
Criminal's Story, 55 U. CIN. L. REv., 831, 834 (1987) (noting public outrage).
36. Son of Sam statutes enacted thus included: ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to 84
(1991) (enacted in 1979); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (Lexis 1998) (enacted in 1984);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4201 to 4202 (West 1989) (enacted in 1978); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1985); CAL. Crv. CODE § 2225 (West
SUpp. 2000) (effective Sept. 15,1986; operative July 1, 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24-4.1-201 to 207 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-218 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 9101 to 9106 (1995) (enacted in 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2000) (enacted in 1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to 32 (1997) (enacted in
1979); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 351-81 to 88 (Lexis 1999) (enacted in 1986); IDAHO
CODE § 19-5301 (1997) (enacted in 1978); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 145/1 to 14 (en
acted in 1979 and repealed in 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 (West Supp. 1999)
(enacted in 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West 1994) (enacted in 1982); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to 7321 (1992) (enacted in 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 346.165
(Michie 1997) (enacted in 1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1831 to 1839 (enacted in
1982 and repealed in 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-E (West Supp. 1999)
(enacted in 1997); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 854 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (enacted in
1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8 (enacted in 1977 and repealed in 1993 (eff.
Jan. 1, 1995)); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West 1998) (enacted in 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (West Supp. 2000) (enacted in 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-38
1 to 11 (1994) (enacted in 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (enacted in 1981 and
repealed in 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-101 to 133 (1999) (enacted in 1977); NEB.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1835 to 1840 (Michie 1994) (enacted in 1978); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 217.265 (enacted in 1981 and repealed in 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-28 to
33 (West 1986) (enacted in 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie Supp. 1999)
(enacted in 1983 and effective until July 1, 2001); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (enacted in
1977 and repealed in 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01 (1996) (enacted in 1993);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01 to .06 (West 1997) (enacted in 1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (West SUpp. 2000) (enacted in 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (Supp.
1998) (enacted in 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8312 (enacted in 1982 and repealed in
1995); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-1 to 12 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (enacted in 1983 and ruled
unconstitutional in its entirety in Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670 (R.1. 1997)); S.c.
CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1980); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23A-28A-l to 14 (Michie 1998) (enacted in 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13
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The Fall of the Son of Sam Statute: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board37

In 1981 publishing giant Simon & Schuster purchased the
rights to Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family, a book written by a pre
viously obscure organized crime figure, Henry Hill ("Hill").38 The
book was published in 1986 and described several crimes commit
ted by Hill and his associates. 39 Wiseguy was a best seller and the
basis for the hit movie GoodFellas. 40 On June 15, 1987, the New
York Crime Victims Board ("Board") determined that Simon &
Schuster had improperly failed to tum over the contract which was
covered under New York's Son of Sam law. 41 The Board ordered
the publisher to release all contractual payments owed to Hill or his
representatives under the contract and ordered the money held in
escrow for victims of crimes committed by Hill.42 In addition, the
Board ordered Hill to tum over the money he had already re
ceived. 43 Simon & Schuster sued the Board in federal court seeking
a declaration that the New York Son of Sam law violated the First
Amendment and an injunction barring the statute's enforcement,
based on the argument that the statute placed an improper financial
burden on content-based speech.44
401 to 411 (Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1994) (replacing TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to
208, which was enacted in 1974 and repealed in 1994); TEX. REv. ill. STAT. ANN. art.
8309-1 (enacted in 1979 and repealed in 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.3 (1999)
(enacted in 1996) (replacing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5, which was enacted in 1991
and repealed in 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-368.19 to .22 (Michie 1995) (enacted in
199O); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 to 290 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (enacted in
1979); W. VA. CODE §§ 14-2B-1 to 11 (Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 949.165(2} (West 1996) (enacted in 1983 and effective May 18, 1984); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1-40-301 to 308 (Lexis 1999) (enacted in 1997).
Only three states have not passed any type of Son of Sam legislation: New Hamp
shire, North Carolina, and Vermont. Seven states have repealed their Son of Sam stat
utes and have not replaced them: Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada,
Rhode Island, and Texas. That leaves 40 states with Son of Sam statutes still on the
books.
37. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
38. See id. at 112.
39. See id. at 112-13.
40. See id. at 114.
41. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170,172-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
42. See id. at 173.
43. See id.
44. See id. As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, a statute is pre
sumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on
speakers because of the content of their speech. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,
447 (1991). The Court has consistently held that the financial regulation of speech
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The District and Appellate Court Decisions

The First Amendment states in pertinent part, "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. . . ."45 To determine whether the statute violated Hill's First
Amendment rights, the United States District Court for the South
ern District of New York applied the intermediate scrutiny analysis
used in United States v. O'Brien,46 and found the statute constitu
tiona1. 47 Consequently, the court upheld the Board's decision. 48
The district court found that a "sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element [of receiving a profit]
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."49
The court reasoned that although the statute made it more difficult
to publish books in conjunction with criminal sources, it did not
prohibit such arrangements. 50 The Board's job, according to the
court, was to review whether the Son of Sam statute applied to cer
tain contracts, not to decide newsworthiness or educational value. 51
Therefore, any burden on free speech was incidenta1. 52 The court
ruled that, in the end, the statute <;mly affected the non-expressive
element of the transaction-receiVing a profit. 53 The court also
held that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve the state's inter
est in compensating crime victims because such an interest did not
involve suppressing speech, but merely attached the proceeds of
that speech for the benefit of the victim. 54
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reached the same conclusion and affirmed the district
raises the specter that the government, through content-based burdens, may drive cer
tain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. See id. at 448-49.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien Court held that when speech and non
speech elements are combined in the same conduct, the First Amendment is not in
fringed if the government demonstrates (1) that it had the power to enact the law, (2)
that the law serves a substantial or important governmental interest, (3) that the law is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) that the restriction on speech is
no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest. See id. at 376-77.
47. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 724 F. Supp. at 177-79.
48. See id. at 180 (finding that section 632-a was constitutional under both the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
49. Id. at 178 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
50. See id. at 176 (noting that payment is only delayed, not denied, to the
criminals) .
51. See id.
52. See id. at 177.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 178-79.
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court's decision, but for different reasons. 55 The appellate court
found that the statute directly burdened the speech of criminals
who wanted to sell their stories, therefore making it a content
based restriction. 56 However, the court found that strict scrutiny,
and not the O'Brien test, was the correct standard to apply.57 Ac
cording to the court, "for the State to enforce a content-based ex
clusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end."58 Nevertheless, the court found that the statute met
strict scrutiny standards because it was narrowly drawn to satisfy
the compelling interest of ensuring that criminals do not profit from
their crimes at the expense of victims.59 Still dissatisfied, Simon &
Schuster appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
2.

The Supreme Court Decision

The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts'
decisions and found the New York statute unconstitutional. 60
Although the Court agreed with the Second Circuit Court of Ap
peals that the strict scrutiny test should apply, it found that the Son
of Sam statute was not sufficiently narrow to meet this standard.61
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the New York Son of
Sam law was a content-based statute which singled out, and there
fore discriminated against, a specific form of speech-the expres
sive activity of a wrongdoer. 62 Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor stated, "'[r]egulations which permit the Government to
discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be
tolerated under the First Amendment."'63 Having found that the
Son of Sam law was a content-based statute, the Court applied the
strict scrutiny test. 64
First, the Court addressed whether the state met its burden of
55. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 778 (2d Cir. 1990).
56. See id. at 781-82.
57. See id. at 782 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
58. [d.
59. See id. at 783.
60. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 116.
63. [d. (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,648-49 (1984)).
64. See id. at 118. Regardless of whether the speaker was Hill, for telling his
story, or Simon & Schuster, for publishing it, the Court found that the statute targeted
content-based speech because "[i]t singles out income derived from expressive activity
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showing that the statute served a compelling governmental inter
est-the first prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court agreed
with the lower courts that New York had two compelling reasons to
regulate the speech: (1) to make sure victims of crime are compen
sated from the fruits of a crime and (2) to prevent offenders from
profiting from their crimes. 65 The Court was not persuaded that the
statute was narrowly drawn to achieve either of these two compel
ling purposes. 66 In fact, the Court found that the statute did not
meet the strict scrutiny standard because it was significantly over
inclusive. 67
According to the Court, the New York statute defined "person
convicted of a crime" too broadly because the definition included
any person who had voluntarily and intelligently admitted to the
commission of a crime, even where the person was not in fact ac
cused of or prosecuted for that crime. 68 Second, the statute applied
to works on any subject, provided that the works expressed the ac
cused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emo
tions regarding the person's crime, however tangentially or
incidentally.69 As a result, the statute would "encompass a poten
tially very large number of works."70 On these points, the Court
offered several examples of prominent people who could have been
affected by this statute, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Saint Augustine. 71 As a result, the Court concluded that the statute
was over-inclusive, and therefore, not narrowly tailored to achieve
for a burden the State places on no other income, and it is directed only at works with a
specified content." Id.
65. See id. at 118-19. The Court was careful to note, however, that there was no
compelling interest in "'ensuring that criminals do not profit from storytelling about
their crimes before their victims have a meaningful opportunity to be compensated for
their injuries.'" Id. at 119 (citation omitted). As such, the inquiry into whether the
statute was narrowly tailored must be limited to the compelling interest in compensat
ing victims. See id. at 120-21.
66. See id. at 121-23.
67. See id. at 121. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, stated that the viola
tion of the First Amendment itself was a full and sufficient reason for holding the stat
ute unconstitutional. See id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy felt the
statute was unconstitutional because it was a content-based restriction and that borrow
ing the compelling interests and narrowly tailoring analysis was "ill-advised." Id. (Ken
nedy, J., concurring).
68. See id. at 121; see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1991).
69. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 121.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 121-22 (finding that other works, such as The Autobiography of
Malcom X and Henry Thoreau's Civil Disobedience, would have been subjected to New
York's Son of Sam Law had it been enacted at the time of their publication).
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the state's compelling governmental interest of compensating crime
victims from profits of crime.72
The Court also implied that the statute was under-inclusive be
cause it compensated victims of crimes only when the offender
profited from selling his or her story, but not from the offender's
other assets.73 The Court stated that the Board could not "explain
why the State should have any greater interest in compensating vic
tims from the proceeds of such 'storytelling' than from any of the
criminal's other assets."74 Rather than singling out storytelling, the
statute might have fared better if it had looked to all forms of assets
held by the offender.75
Another flaw in the New York statute identified by the Court
was that the compelling interest of compensating victims was third
in priority for payment from the escrow fund.7 6 The first priority
was payment for legal representation.77 The second priority was
payment to the state in subrogation for compensation paid to vic
tims of the crime.78 Only after those interests had been paid and
after a civil judgment had been obtained could the victim recover
from the fund.7 9 Under this scheme, the Court seemed skeptical
that the statute's purpose in fact matched the underlying policy of
compensating victims.80
Although the Court only directly addressed the New York stat
ute in Simon & Schuster, after the decision most Son of Sam laws
were called into question. 81 After all, they had been patterned after
72. See id. at 123.
73. See id. at 119.
74. Id.
75. See id. Justice Blackmun, in a separate opinion, concurred in the result, but
argued that the Court should explicitly state that the statute was under-inclusive as well
as over-inclusive. See id. at 123-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. See id. at 110.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 123 (stating that while the interest of compensating victims is a
compelling one, New York's statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve that
objective).
81. See Nosrati, supra note 35, at 961; Debra Shields, Note, The Constitutionality
of Current Crime Victimization Statutes: A Survey, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J., 929, 930-31 (1994) (stating that "[t]he constitutionality of all crime victimiza
tion statutes has been seriously jeopardized by the Simon & Schuster decision because
most states had adopted statutes very similar to New York's legislation"); Melissa M.
Erlemeier, Note, The First Amendment Prevails over Crime Victim Compensation: Si
mon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 26
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1301, 1309 (1992-1993) (noting that after Simon & Schuster, most
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the same flaws that led to the demise of New York's Son of Sam
law. 82 Thus, in response to Simon & Schuster, several states
amended or replaced their Son of Sam laws in an effort to make
them constitutional. 83
C.

Towards Constitutionality
1.

Content-Neutral

Critical to the constitutionality of a Son of Sam statute is the
statute's content-neutrality. Simon & Schuster provides that a stat
ute which singles out the speech of criminal authors solely because
of its content will be subject to strict scrutiny.84 While the Court
did not specifically address whether a statute that makes no refer
ence to the proceeds generated by First Amendment activities
would be considered constitutional, it implied that a statute that did
not single out speech or place a financial burden on speech may be
content-neutral85 and thus, might withstand judicial scrutiny.86 It is
important for a court to find that the statute is content-neutral be
cause a content-neutral statute only needs to meet the less rigorous
"intermediate scrutiny" test set forth in United States v. O'Brien.87
Thus, any future Son of Sam legislation should strive to be contentstates modified their version of New York's Son of Sam law in an effort to satisfy the
Court's constitutional analysis).
82. See Kevin S. Reed, Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes and the First Amendment:
Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Board, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'y 1060, 1060 (1992) ("Simon and Schuster foretells the demise of all of these crimi
nal anti-profit provisions."); Shields, supra note 81, at 933 (concluding that "forty-one
out of forty-five current state crime victimization statutes in the country are unconstitu
tional under Simon and Schuster"). See supra note 36 for a complete list of states that
enacted Son of Sam statutes in the wake of New York's legislation.
83. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (Supp. 2000) (amended in 1992, 1994, and
1995); COLO. REv. STAT § 24-4.1-201 (1991 & Supp. 1999) (amended in 1988 and 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West 1994) (amended in 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319
(1992) (amended in 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (transferred to section 854 by
section 7, ch. 585, Acts 1996) (1996 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632(a) (amended
in 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8312 (1998) (amended in 1995); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-13-403 (Supp. 1999) (amended in 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie
1995) (amended in 1992).
84. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 117-18. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discus
sion of the strict scrutiny test as applied in Simon & Schuster.
85. Content-neutral speech restrictions are "those that 'are justified without refer
ence to the content of the regulated speech.'" Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)
(quoting Virginia Pharrn. Bd. v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976)).
86. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 120-21.
87. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See supra note 46 for a discussion of the O'Brien test.
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neutral to receive the benefit of this less rigorous standard of
review.
Massachusetts' former statute regarding notoriety-for-profit
fell within the category of statutes subject to strict scrutiny by virtue
of its forfeiture provisions. Massachusetts' statute, like New York's
former Son of Sam statute, was not content-neutral because it re
quired forfeiture of proceeds earned by a criminal defendant "with
respect to the reenactment of such crime, by way of movie, book,
magazine article, radio or television presentation, live entertain
ment of any kind, or from the expression of such person's thoughts,
feelings, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime. "88 Many
other state statutes contained similar forfeiture language. 89 For in
stance, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that its state's Son of
Sam statute was unconstitutional because the statute's applicability
was limited solely to expressive activity.90
Content neutrality may be accomplished by targeting all of the
offender's assets, rather than just assets related to "story-telling."
For instance, Iowa has amended its Son of Sam statute for this pur
pose and now defines "proceeds" as "the fruits of the crime from
whatever source received."91 Similarly, New York amended its stat
ute in 1992 to address this concern.92 The new statute removes the
88. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8, repealed by St.1993, ch. 478, § 3 (eff.
Jan. 1, 1995).
89. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 41-9-80 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §12.61.020(a) (Lexis
1998); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(A) (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90
308(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1999); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2225(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) (repealed; replaced with
§ 24-4.1-201(1.5)(a»; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(a) (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1) (West 1996 &
Supp. 2000); GA. CoDE ANN. § 17-14-31(a)(1) (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 351
81(2) (Lexis 1999); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3
(West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319(a) (1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
346.165(1) (Michie 1997); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 854(a)(5) (1996 & Supp. 1999);
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 780.768(2) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(2)
(West Supp. 2000) (repealed); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-5 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 53-9-104(d) (1999); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-1836 (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:4B-28 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(A) (Michie Supp. 1999); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2969.02(A) (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (Supp. 1998)
(repealed); S.c. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-28A-1 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.2(2) (1999); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West 1996).
90. See Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 677 (R.I. 1997).
91. IOWA CODE ANN. § 91O.15(1)(e) (West 1994).
92. The new statute defines "profits from the crime" as:
(i) [A]ny property obtained through or income generated from the commis
sion of a crime of which the defendant was convicted; (ii) any property ob
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language that specified speech-related activities and subjects all
crime-related assets to seizure. 93 At least one commentator be
lieves that as a result of these changes, the New York statute now
complies with Simon & Schuster.94
Still, changes that create "content-neutrality" may not be
enough to ensure the constitutionality of a Son of Sam law. The
Court in Simon & Schuster merely indicated that a statute would be
more likely to pass constitutional muster if it was content-neutral,
but it did not state what measures would be required to create a
content-neutral statute. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that
"the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [will not] be
enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on con
tent."95 Although these new Son of Sam statutes purport to encom
pass all assets, "storytelling" is still their natural target, and often
will be the only source of assets for criminals. Therefore, it is of
course possible that a court would look past new purportedly con
tent-neutral language and still find a content-based purpose. 96 For
precisely this reason, commentators have emphasized that a Son of
tained by or income generated from the sale, conversion or exchange of
proceeds of a crime ... ; and (iii) any property which the defendant obtained
or income generated as a result of having committed the crime, including any
assets obtained through the use of unique knowledge obtained during the
commission of, or in preparation for the commission of, the crime, as well as
any property obtained by or income generated from the sale, conversion or
exchange of such property and any gain realized by such sale, conversion or
exchange.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l)(b) (McKinney 1996).
93. See id.
94. See Amr F. Amer, Comment, Play It Again Sam: New York's Renewed Effort
to Enact A "Son of Sam" Law That Passes Constitutional Muster, 14 Loy. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 115, 133-35 (1993).
95. Thrner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,642-43 (1994).
96. Although a statute may be content-neutral because it applies to all crime
related assets rather than just speech-related activity, the most common way in which a
criminal profits from his notoriety is through books, film, or television which are pro
tected activities under the First Amendment. Therefore, the New York Crime Victims
Board still considers its statute vulnerable to challenge. The statute was challenged in
1997 when Sammy "The Bull" Gravano sold the rights to his story which resulted in the
book Underboss. See New York State Crime Victims Bd. v. T.J.M. Prods., Inc., 673
N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). The parties that contracted with Gravano
sought to dismiss the complaint brought by the New York Crime Victims Board and the
case went before the New York Supreme Court. See id. at 872-73. The complaint was
dismissed, not on constitutional grounds, but rather on the grounds that the statute's
definition of crime did not include the federal crimes for which Gravano was convicted.
See id. at 875. Also, the new statute did not prohibit a contracting party from making
agreements with the representative or assignee of a person charged or convicted of a
crime. See id. at 877.
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Sam statute must be narrowly tailored to apply to all of a defend
ant's crime-related assets.9 7
2.

Narrowly Tailored Statute

In addition to being content-neutral, a notoriety-for-profit stat
ute should be tailored to fulfill the circumscribed purpose of com
pensating victims. 98 This narrow tailoring will allow the statute to
withstand even strict scrutiny review if a court should find that the
statute is not content-neutral. Narrow tailoring may be accom
plished by changing the definitions of to whom and to what the
statute will apply as reflected in two key terms: "defendant" and
"profits of crime."
a.

The definition of "defendant"

When creating a notoriety-for-profit statute, the definition of
who the statute applies to, typically the "defendant," should be tai
lored to focus on only those offenders who have an obligation to
compensate victims. In Simon & Schuster, the Court held that the
New York statute was not narrowly tailored, in part, because the
definition of a "person convicted of a crime" was overly broad. 99
The definition allowed the forfeiture of proceeds from anyone ac
cused of a crime or anyone who voluntarily admitted to the com
mission of a crime, regardless of whether that person was
eventually convicted. 1°O Several states now have definitions that
conform to Simon & Schuster's requirements and may provide
model language for a new Son of Sam statute.
For example, Minnesota now defines "offender" as a "person
convicted of a crime or found not guilty of a crime by reason of
insanity." 101 Similarly, Iowa narrowly defines "convicted felon" as
"a person initially convicted, or found not guilty by reason of in
97. See Reed, supra note 82, at 1066-68; see also Robert Mazow, Comment, Si
mon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board: Should the Supreme Court
Have Invalidated New York's Son of Sam Statute?, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 813, 841-43
(1994); ErJemeier, supra note 81, at 1331.
98. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120-21 (1991).
99. See id. at 121; see supra note 68 and accompanying text for the New York
statute's definition of a "person convicted of a crime."
100. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 501 U.S. at 121. For the same reason, Alaska's
statute is unconstitutional. Alaska defines "offender" as a "person who has committed
a crime in this state, whether or not the person has been convicted of the crime."
ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(e)(1) (Lexis 1998).
101. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 611A.68(1)(c) (Supp. 2000).
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sanity ... either by a court or jury trial or by entry of a guilty plea in
court."102 Since Simon & Schuster, New York, Maryland, and Dela
ware have also amended their overly broad definitions. New York's
statute now applies only to those who have committed felonies. 103
While Maryland still defines "defendant" as an individual charged
with or convicted of a crime,104 it now requires that any seized
money be returned to a defendant who is acquitted. lOS The Court
of Appeals of Maryland has since examined the new statute and has
not found fault with this new definition.106

b.

Tailoring the term "profits from crime"

Another problem with the New York statute in Simon &
Schuster was the statute's overly broad definition of "profits from
crime."107 The Court found that, as written, the statute included all
forms of storytelling for profit, even if the work had little to do with
the offender's crime. 108 The Court pointed out the problem by not
ing a range of classic and contemporary literary works that could
have been affected by the statute, such as The Confessions of St.
Augustine, which only tangentially mentions crime. 109 One method
of meeting the narrowly tailored requirement of the strict scrutiny
test has been to add language to limit what forms of expression may
102. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(1)(a) (West 1994).
103. "Crime" is defined as: "any felony defined in the penal law or any other
chapter of the consolidated laws of the state." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(I)(a) (McKin
ney 1996). Interestingly, New York seems to have made this definition too narrow.
Because the definition does not include federal crimes, the New York Supreme Court
for New York County found that the statute did not apply to publication contracts with
Sammy Gravano. See New York State Crime Victims Bd. v. T.J.M. Prods. Inc., 673
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1998). Other states that define "crime" to include only "major" crimes
such as felonies include: ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13
4201(1) (West 1989); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2225(b)(I) (West Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1) (West
1996 & Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 910.15(1)(c) (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(b) (West Supp. 2000); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(A) (Michie Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01(1)
(1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-402(2) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.19
(Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE § 14-2B-3(a) (Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 949.165(1)(a) (West 1996).
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 854(a)(2) (1996 & Supp. 1999).
105. See id. § 854(e)(3)(ii).
106. See Curran v. Price, 638 A.2d 93, 99 (Md. 1994) (declining to address the
merits of the constitutionality of section 764 (now section 854».
107. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121 (1991).
108. See id. at 120-21.
109. See id. at 121.
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be reached by the statute. States have taken various approaches to
narrow the scope of the term "profits of a crime."
Several states that formerly targeted specific forms of expres
sion within their Son of Sam laws have since tailored their statutes
to expressly exclude from the reach of the law works that contain
only incidental or tangential references to crimes. Virginia, for ex
ample, amended its statute so that profits from crimes "shall not be
subject to forfeiture unless an integral part of the work is a depic
tion or discussion of the defendant's crime or an impression of the
defendant's thoughts, opinions, or emotions regarding such
crime."110 Kansas has also amended its statute so that only the pro
ceeds from a work that deals "principally with the crime for which
the person is accused and convicted" are subject to forfeiture. 1l1
Limiting language does not, however, necessarily mean that
the statute will be found constitutional. When Rhode Island's stat
ute was challenged in 1997, the Rhode Island Attorney General ar
gued that because the statute only applied to people convicted of
felonies, the law applied "only to 'significant' commercial exploita
tions of a crime and that 'a tangential or peripheral reference to a
prior crime would not trigger [its] provisions."'1l2 However, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court found that this restriction did not al
leviate the problem that tangential or incidental references to crime
were still proscribed by the act.1 13 Similarly, Maryland amended its
Son of Sam statute by removing language specific to forms of ex
pression and by providing that the statute would not apply to a
work that only "tangentially or incidentally relates to the crime."114
Presently, Maryland's Son of Sam law targets any profits directly or
indirectly received from the crime, including, but not limited to,
First Amendment activities under its definition of "notoriety of
crimes contract."115 The revised statute was challenged in the 1994
case Curran v. Price.11 6 Notwithstanding amendments to the stat
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie 1995).
111. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319(a) (1992).
112. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 677 (R.I. 1997) (citation omitted).
113. See id. (stating that "the act [is] over broad because it affects all expressive
activity").
114. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 854(c)(3) (1996 & Supp. 1999).
115. See id. § 854(a)(5). See infra note 118 for Maryland's definition of "notori
ety of crimes contract."
116. 638 A.2d 93 (Md. 1994). Ronald Price was a high school teacher indicted in
1993 for sexual abuse of students. See id. at 97. In September 1993, Mr. Price was
convicted of child sexual abuse and another charge and was sentenced to 26 years im
prisonment. See id. at 97 n.1. In a news interview, Price stated that he had entered into
a contract to sell his story. See id. at 97 & n.2. The Maryland Attorney General sought
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ute intended to make it comply with Simon & Schuster,117 amicus
for the appellant, the ACLU, argued that the statute was overly
broad due to the definition of "notoriety of crimes contract" and
the procedures set forth for review of such contracts by the Attor
ney General. 118 The Attorney General argued, however, that any
overbreadth problems in the definitions were cured by section
746(c)(3) because it removed contracts with subject matter only
tangentially or incidentally crime-related from the scope of the stat
ute. 119 Given that even tangentially or incidentally crime-related
works would be required to be submitted to the Attorney General
for review, the question before the Maryland Court of Appeals was
whether the burden of submission and review was necessary and
narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest without impermissibly
burdening speech unrelated to the advancement of that interest. 12o
More specifically, the court questioned whether the procedural
safeguards were sufficient to justify the state's prior restraint of
speech.121 The court found that the state, and not the defendant,
should have the burden of proving that the work falls within the
an interlocutory injunction requiring Price to turn over the contract along with any
payments received. See id. The American Civil Liberties Union, appearing as amicus
curiae, challenged the statute as being "a content-based restriction which sweeps too
broadly, unconstitutionally burdening speech that is protected by the First Amend
ment." Id. at 98. Price, while contending that the statute was unconstitutional, put
forth no legal arguments supporting this contention. See id.
117. Amendments in 1993 added section 764(c)(2) & (3) [now section 854(c)(2) &
(3)]. Subsection (c)(2) mandates that the Attorney General give his or her decision
within 180 days, while subsection (c)(3) states that there is a rebuttable presumption
that the contract is a notoriety of crimes contract. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 854(c)(2) & (3) (1996 & Supp. 1999).
118. See Curran, 638 A.2d at 101. A "notoriety of crimes contract" was defined
in section 764(a)(5) [now section 854(a)(5)] of the Maryland statute as:
(i) The reenactment of a crime by way of a movie, book, magazine article,
tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television presentation, or live
entertainment of any kind; (ii) The expression of the defendant's thoughts,
feelings, opinions, or emotions regarding a crime involving or causing personal
injury, death, or property loss as a direct result of the crime; or (iii) The pay
ment or exchange of any money or other consideration or the proceeds or
profits that directly or indirectly result from a crime, a sentence, or the notori
ety of a crime or sentence.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 854(a)(5) (1996 & Supp. 1999). The Attorney General's
review procedures allowed the Attorney General to determine whether a contract qual
ified as a "notoriety of crimes contract." See Curran, 638 A.2d at 101.
119. See Curran, 638 A.2d at 101-02; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(3)
(Supp. 1993) [(now § 854(c)(3) (1996 & Supp. 1999)].
120. See Curran, 638 A.2d at 102.
121. See id. at 102-03.
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regulatory scheme. 122 The burden of proof within the Maryland
statute, therefore, was on the wrong party. In addition, the defend
ant's right to seek judicial review of the Attorney General's opin
ion, which could take up to six months, was an unacceptable time
frame under federal precedent.123 Thus, the Maryland Court of
Appeals found that the statute's procedural safeguards were insuffi
cient to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Although inroads have been made to constructing a Son of
Sam law that withstands constitutional scrutiny, the experience of
various states, such as those described above, suggests that many
obstacles remain. Given that problems will arise whenever a Son of
Sam law is enacted, not only because of constitutional ramifications
but also because there are those who oppose such laws on principle,
one must consider the extent to which a Son of Sam statute is bene
ficial and necessary to justify the efforts of legislators.

II.

Is

A "SON OF SAM" LAW NECESSARY?

Although popular with the public and lawmakers, the very
need for a Son of Sam law is often called into question. In light of
Simon & Schuster, not only does a Son of Sam law present constitu
tional problems, but because these laws are rarely used, opponents
wonder if they are even necessary. Furthermore, critics of such
statutes contend that the general goals of Son of Sam laws may be
achieved in other ways.124 After considering each of these argu
122. See id. at 102. The court found that a prior restraint on speech places a
heavy burden on the state to justify the restraint because '''any system of prior restraint
of expression ... bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.'" Id.
(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). The court pointed out
that "[a] prior restraint of unprotected speech must include sufficient procedural safe·
guards to avoid unduly suppressing protected speech." Id. (citing Freedman v. Mary
land, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)). In Freedman, the Supreme Court set forth procedural
requirements for prior restraints on speech in a motion picture censorship system. See
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59. The Court held that the state must bear the burden of
proving that a film is unprotected expression. See id. at 58. It further held that while
the state may require advance submission of films, this requirement may not be admin
istered in such a way as to make the state's decision final; only a procedure requiring a
judicial determination constitutes a valid restraint. See id. "[T]he procedure must also
assure a prompt final judicial decision." Id. at 59. The Maryland Court of Appeals
found section 764's review process in conflict with the Freedman standard. See Curran,
638 A.2d at 103.
123. The Freedman Court considered a six month delay until final appellate re
view of a censorship decision an impermissible delay; the Maryland statute allowed six
months for review by the Attorney General before the possibility of judicial review,
which the court likewise found to be a heavy burden. See Curran, 638 A.2d at 103.
124. See Michelle L. Learned, The Constitutionality of Cashing in on Crime: Free
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ments, however, it becomes evident that a notoriety-for-profit stat
ute, such as is embodied in the bill currently pending before the
Massachusetts Legislature,125 is the best method of protecting vic
tims in a consistent and clearly defined manner.
A.

Would a Son of Sam Statute Be Used?

Notoriety-for-profit laws are rarely used since only a small per
centage of all criminals have sufficient notoriety or a compelling
enough story to get a book or movie deal. In fact, Son of Sam stat
utes have been used infrequently in the past.1 26 Between its enact
ment in 1977 and its invalidation by the Supreme Court in 1991, the
New York law was used only a "handful of times."127 The Massa
chusetts version was used only once, in 1987, when former Medford
police officer Gerald W. Clemente, Ir. published a book detailing
his corrupt activities. 128 The book, The Cops Are Robbers, was a
commercial success, and he received offers to make his story into a
film.129 Clemente did not receive profits from the book, however,
since the bank he burglarized filed a civil suit and obtained an in
junction preventing him from receiving royalty payments.1 30
With so few criminals capitalizing on their notoriety, it might
Expression, Free Enterprise and Not-Profit Conditions of Probation, 1 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & ApPELLATE ADVOC. 79, 91-92 (1995) (arguing that recovery through civil ac
tions is sufficient to compensate victims and avoid the First Amendment problems
presented by Son of Sam statutes and special probation orders).
125. See infra Part III.B.
126. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Vic
tims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 111 (1991).
127. See id. at 111. The cases cited in Simon & Schuster include Jean Harris, the
convicted killer of "Scarsdale Diet" Doctor Herman Tarnower; Mark David Chapman,
the man convicted of assassinating John Lennon; and R. Foster Winans, the former Wall
Street Journal columnist convicted of insider trading. See id.
128. See Duncan Mansfield, Bill Filed to Limit Criminals' Profits for Crime
Books, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 4, 1987, available in 1987 WL 3188327 (noting
that after Clemente's book was published in June 1987, state officials were angered
about the prospect of him receiving profits from the book, and tried to get the Treas
urer's Office to enforce the state's Son of Sam law. The Treasurer's office said the law
was too vague. Thereafter, lawmakers filed a bill on November 4, 1987 to strengthen
the state's Son of Sam law).
129. See Lawmakers Act to Bar Inmates' Book Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1987,
at 39 (noting that nine movie companies approached Clemente about acquiring film
rights to his book). The book did in fact become a made-for-television movie, "Good
Cops, Bad Cops," which aired on NBC on December 9,1990. See Ron Miller, When the
Cops Are Robbers, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 9, 1990, at 7.
130. See Mansfield, supra note 128 (reporting that an attorney for the publisher
of the book stated that Clemente cannot "personally... get a distribution of funds"
until the case is settled, although his profits will not amount to much due to the book's
limited distribution).
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seem as though Son of Sam legislation is unnec~ssary in the Com
monwealth. However, the mere infrequency of the statute's use in
the past does not provide a valid argument for keeping the statute
off the books. To the contrary, a Son of Sam statute is necessary to
prevent a negative image of the criminal justice system. Moreover,
the growing popularity of the "true crime" industryl3l suggests that
Son of Sam legislation may be used more frequently than it was in
the past.
The cases in which Son of Sam statutes are invoked are typi
cally high profile, and therefore, have the potential to influence
public perception of our judicial system. For instance, if offenders
are free to profit from their victims' misery, the criminal justice sys
tem may be seen as allowing the commercialization of crimes,
thereby minimizing the plight of victims. Additionally, the absence
of a Son of Sam statute may lead the courts to attempt to limit
criminals from profiting from their crimes, thus leaving the judicial
system open to criticisms that it is legislating rather than adjudicat
ing. For example, in Commonwealth v. Power,132 there was no Son
of Sam statute, and so the court imposed probationary terms that
would foreclose the offender's ability to profit from her crime by
entirely prohibiting her from publishing her story.B3 An effective
notoriety-for-profit statute, had it been available at the time of the
Power case, would have better safeguarded the public image of the
criminal justice system without forcing the court to fashion its own
131. See Elizabeth Jensen & Ellen Groham, Stomping Out TV Violence: A Losing
Fight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1993, at B1 (commenting on the large amount of prime time
hours devoted to news magazine shows covering crime and made-for-tv movies about
crime); Lisa W. Foderaro, Crimes of Passion, Deals of a Lifetime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1991, § 4, at 6 (citing recent proliferation in true crime industry).
132. 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995).
133. The probation contract contained the following provision:
You, your assignees and your representatives acting on your authority are pro
hibited from directly or indirectly engaging in any profit or benefit generating
activity relating to the publication of facts or circumstances pertaining to your
involvement in the criminal acts for which you stand convicted (including con
tracting with any person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other
legal entity with respect to the commission and/or reenactment of your crimes,
by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record,
radio or television presentations, live entertainment of any kind, or from the
expression of your thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such
crime). This prohibition includes those events undertaken and experienced by
you while avoiding apprehension from the authorities. Any action taken by
you whether by way of execution of power of attorney, creation of corporate
entities or like action to avoid compliance with this condition of probation will
be considered a violation of probation conditions.
Id. at 89.
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means of protecting the victim.134
Meanwhile, the "true crime" industry continues to biossom.B 5
More and more books, movies, and television dramas revolve
around real-life incidents and offenders. Given the public's seem
ingly insatiable thirst for this type of "entertainment," an effective
notoriety-for-profit law is needed to counterbalance the negative
impact of public perception of the criminal justice system. Indeed,
the burgeoning popularity of notorious crimes as the focus of soci
ety's entertainment suggests more criminals will have greater op
portunity to profit from their crimes, thus calling for greater use of
Son of Sam statutes in the future. Consequently, notwithstanding
the previously rare usage of Son of Sam statutes, an effective noto
riety-for-profit law is necessary in the Commonwealth. Such legis
lation would be unnecessary only if there were other means
available to prevent criminals from profiting from their wrongdoing
while simultaneously compensating victims.

B.

Non-Statutory Methods Would Not Be as Effective as a Son
of Sam Law

Civil libertarians opposed to the use of notoriety-for-profit
laws primarily rely on two arguments. The first argument is that
these laws have a chilling effect on the First Amendment rights of
criminals.1 36 Secondly, the general goals of these laws may be ac
complished through other methods, including probationary require
ments, restitution orders, and civil actions filed by the victims
themselves.137 In fact, one could argue that the Power case proves
that probationary requirements provide a constitutional alternative
to a statutory framework prohibiting criminals from profiting from
their crimes.B 8 In reality, however, each of these alternatives
134. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
problems that arose from the probation terms in the Power case.
135. For a discussion of the escalation of the "true crime" market see supra note
131.
136. See Nostrati, supra note 35, at 977,983 (arguing that California's Son of Sam
law has a chilling effect on speech); Kerry Casey, Note, The Virginia "Son of Sam" Law:
An Unconstitutional Approach to Victim Compensation, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RIGHTS J. 495 (1993) (arguing that Virginia's law has a chilling effect on speech).
137. See, e.g., Learned, supra note 124, at 79-93 (questioning the constitutionality
of special conditions on probation and suggesting that civil judgments adequately pro
tect victims without implicating the First Amendment).
138. See id: at 89-90; see also infra notes 147-148 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's ruling that probation terms
instituted in the Power case did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
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civil action, restitution, and probation-have serious flaws that a
well-written Son of Sam statute could eliminate.
A civil action brought against an offender may certainly serve
to compensate a victim. Unfortunately, it is impractical for every
victim in every case to obtain a civil judgment against an offender's
assets. Even assuming that an action was successful, an offender
may not have assets to satisfy a judgment. Of course in some cases,
such as with Power or Berkowitz, it may be obvious from the time
of arrest, due to the amount of publicity surrounding the case, that
an offender could easily sell his or her story and acquire substantial
assets. However, in many cases the victim may choose not to bring
a civil action only to find out later, after seeing the movie or reading
the book, that the offender sold his or her story. One such example
is the case of Henry Hill, a little-known criminal outside local or
ganized crime circles until a book about his exploits was published
and later used as the basis for the movie GoodFellas .139 Thus, be
cause even an obscure offender needs only a compelling story and a
willingness to strike it rich in the "true crime" market, a Son of Sam
law is necessary to ensure that victims will be compensated regard
less of whether or not it occurs to them to bring a civil action
against their offenders. Moreover, a victim may not have the re
sources to bring suit. Consequently, the prospects of a civil action
cannot adequately protect the interest of compensating victims in
all cases of "notorious" crimes.
Similarly, restitution cannot be relied upon to compensate vic
tims in every instance. Many judges are extremely reluctant to or
der restitution if they believe it cannot be paid by the criminal,
especially in situations where the only prospect of restitution is the
possible future sale of the offender's story.1 40 A judge may also
have concerns that a defendant will be compelled to commit an
other crime to pay their obligations. 141 In addition, the loss associ
ated with most crimes cannot be sufficiently computed. Indeed, it
may be impossible to place a monetary value on the loss that is
suffered. Any restitution ordered at sentencing, therefore, is not
139. See Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Vic
tims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 112-14 (1991).
140. See Lorraine Slavin & David J. Sorin, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box
The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORD·
HAM L. REV. 507, 570 (1984) (arguing that victims have a low likelihood of recovering
compensation in the form of restitution).
141. See id.
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only speculative, but may also be considered a token amount to the
victim.
Likewise, probationary terms can be used to compensate vic
tims. Such terms were used in Commonwealth v. Power .142 Power
plead guilty to two indictments-armed robbery and manslaugh
ter-for which the judge sentenced her to eight to twelve years im
prisonment. 143 The judge also ordered twenty years probation with
the special condition attached that Power not profit from her crimes
or her experiences during the years she avoided apprehension. 144
She was then given the opportunity to rescind her guilty plea, but
she declined. 145 Power later appealed the special condition directly
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, arguing that the re
striction imposed a prior restraint on content-based speech, that it
placed her in jeopardy for the actions of third parties, and that the
special condition was unconstitutionally vague. 146
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the special condition as
"reasonably [related] to the goals of sentencing and of probation"
regardless of whether the condition affected a "preferred" righU47
The court also noted that the holding of Simon & Schuster was not
applicable to the case because "[a] special condition of probation is
not subject to the same rigorous First Amendment scrutiny that is
employed against a statute of general applicability. The condition
in the instant case applies only to the defendant and is reasonably
142. 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995).
143. See id. at 89.
144. See id.; see supra note 133 for the specific text of the probation terms set by
the judge. Like Massachusetts, Utah also gives its judges discretion when setting proba
tion and parole terms to restrict criminals from profiting financially from their crimes.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-10.5 (1999) (parole); § 77-18-8.5 (probation). These stat
utes provide, in part:
[T]he court may place the defendant on probation [or parole] and as a
condition of probation [or parole], the court may order the defendant to be
prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging in any profit or benefit generat
ing activity relating to the publication of facts or circumstances pertaining to
the defendant's involvement in the criminal act for which the defendant is
convicted.
Id. § 77-18-8.5(1), § 77-18-10.5(1).
145. See Power, 650 N.E.2d at 89.
146. See id. at 88.
147. See id. at 89. In reaching its decision, the court examined chapter 276, sec
tion 87 of the Massachusetts General Laws which allows a trial court to "place on pro
bation ... any person before it charged with an offense or a crime for such time and
upon such conditions as it deems proper . .. after a finding or verdict of guilty." Id. at
89 (emphasis added). The court also noted the great latitude that judges have in sen
tencing when their sentences are within the limits of the statute. See id.
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related to a valid probation purpose."148 Thus, the Supreme Judi
cial Court upheld the constitutionality of the use of probationary
terms to limit an offender's ability to profit from his or her crime.
Nevertheless, probation is not an effective alternative to a Son
of Sam law. First, probation is not always given; rather, it is within
the court's discretion to require probation. 149 In fact, even in
clearly notorious cases, it may not be imposed. A compelling exam
ple is the case of Commonwealth v. Woodward.1 50 In Woodward, a
British au pair was convicted of killing a baby in her care. 151 Given
the amount of media attention surrounding the case, the sentencing
judge, Judge Hiller B. Zobel, must have known that the defendant
had gained world-wide notoriety and that she was likely to have
ample opportunity to profit from her notoriety. Nevertheless,
Judge Zobel chose not impose any profit-related probationary re
quirements on Woodward. 152 She was left free to market her noto
riety in the United States. 153 This was the situation until the family
of Woodward's victim filed a civil suit in United States District
Court and obtained a preliminary injunction barring Woodward
from spending money connected to the sale of her story.154
148. Id. at 91. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of Simon & Schuster.
149. See supra note 147 for the text of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 87 (1998),
which gives the court discretion in imposing probation.
150. 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998).
151. See id. at 1281. Woodward was convicted of second degree murder, but the
sentence was later reduced to involuntary manslaughter. See Corey Goldberg, Massa
chuseus High Coun Backs Freeing Au Pair in Baby's Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998,
at AI.
152. See Woodward, 694 N.E.2d at 1300 (Greaney, J. dissenting) ("In his memo
randum reducing the verdict, the judge does not ... consider imposing on Woodward
any appropriate terms of probation....").
153. Interestingly, Woodward would have a hard time selling her story in her own
country because the United Kingdom's Press Complaint Commission Code of Practice
forbids the paying of money to convicted criminals and their families. See Midgley,
supra note 4. This is a voluntary code of practice among British newspapers by which
newspapers do not make payments to criminals or their associates unless their story is
deemed to be in the public interest. See Talbot, supra note 6.
154. See Patricia Nealon, U.S. Judge Puts Ban on Woodward's Use of Profits from
Case, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 1998, at B2. The preliminary injunction issued by Judge
William G. Young required Woodward to notify the victim's family and the court if she
signed any contracts to sell her story and barred her from spending the money. See id.
Judge Young stated that Woodward's only potential asset was the value of her celebrity.
See id. According to the judge:
Whatever their protestations, these parties need each other in the most practi
cal sense: absent insurance, if [the victim's family] is to have any chance to
collect [its] expected judgment, Woodward must amass the necessary funds,
and the only potential source appears to be the same media that all parties
agree are most morally repugnant.
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Furthermore, because offenders may not gain fame until their
story is sold, and a court is not in a position to predict whether an
offender will become notorious or otherwise have the opportunity
to benefit financially from his or her crime, victims can not rely on
Power-type restrictions being placed on the offender during sen
tencing. In these cases, neither the state nor the victim knows if the
offender has money-making potential and thus neither is likely to
seek probationary terms that limit the offender's ability to sell his
or her story. Consequently, a system that is triggered at the time a
criminal attempts to sell his or her story is necessary. Such a sys
tem, as would be imposed by Son of Sam legislation, would serve
the state's interests regardless of how little or well-known the crimi
nal was at the time of sentencing. If the criminal proves to be a
notorious one, his or her victims would be compensated.
Probation is also deeply flawed as a means of prohibiting a
criminal from marketing his or her notoriety because a typical pro
bation order is couched in terms of a broad prohibition on an activ
ity that does not allow for exceptions. This was true in the Power
case. As a result of her broad probationary restriction,155 Power
abstained from publishing anything, regardless of content or com
pensation, in fear that such a publication might violate her proba
tion.156 Although Power had indicated that whatever compensation
she would receive would be shared with the family of her victim,157
the threat of revocation remained. 158 Indeed, the terms of the pro
bation order prohibited her from making an agreement with her
victim's family to accomplish this goal. 159 For this reason Power's
own attorney, Rikki Klieman, stated that a statutory scheme may
be preferable to a condition of probation since it would be more
Id.
155. See supra note 133 for the terms of Power's probation. The sweeping nature
of this order may be seen in the first sentence: "You, your assignees and your repre
sentatives acting on your authority are prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging
in any profit or benefit generating activity relating to the publication of facts or circum
stances pertaining to your involvement in the criminal acts for which you stand con
victed." Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Mass. 1995).
156. See, e.g., Jordana Hart, An Inmate's Introspection: Katherine Ann Power
Talks of Her Life and Her Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 1994, at Bl (stating that
Power was refusing, at the time of the interview, any book or movie contracts until after
her appeal of Judge Bank's probation order. The probation order was subsequently
upheld).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See supra note 133 for the terms of Power's probation.
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flexible. 160 Such a scheme would not only allow criminals an oppor
tunity to market their stories without the fear of serving a prison
sentence for violating a court order, but would also provide com
pensation to victims. 161
Based on this analysis, non-statutory alternatives do not ap
pear to achieve the desired social and policy benefits derived from
Son of Sam statutes. A Son of Sam statute is therefore necessary to
ensure that all victims of crime are compensated when a criminal is
able to profit from his or her crime.
C.

Public Policy Favors Publication by Criminal Offenders

A consideration which enters into the Son of Sam debate per
haps more rarely than it should is that criminal offenders should be
able to publish their life stories, without restriction, for the benefit
of society. This public policy argument is persuasive even where
free speech (i.e., First Amendment) rationales are not implicated.
However, a Son of Sam statute does not have to undermine the
benefits a society gains when a criminal relates the events that have
made him or her notorious; rather, a properly drafted statute can
ensure that this benefit is conferred.
When a criminal details his experiences, society is benefitted
because various specialists can gain a greater knowledge of the
criminal mind and its methods. In particular, law enforcement,
criminologists, and sociologists often gain a better understanding of
the offender's life experience. 162 This insight may not only be of
academic interest, but may serve the practical purposes of criminal
profiling and lead to the earlier apprehension of other criminals. 163
Some critics may contend that Son of Sam legislation discourages
criminals from relating this information. If a criminal has nothing
to gain financially from his or her pUblication, then the argument is
that he or she has no incentive to relate the story and may choose
not to do so. However, Son of Sam legislation does not always
eliminate an offender's ability to profit financially from recounting
his or her story.164 Additionally, offenders might have other mo
160. See Greater Boston (WGBH television broadcast, Nov. 17,1997).
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., JOEL NORRIS, SERIAL KILLERS: THE GROWING MENACE (1988).
The author of this book interviewed several serial killers, including Henry Lee Lucas,
Carlton Gary, Bobby Joe Long, Leonard Lake, and Charles Manson, to discern the
nature and unifying patterns of serial killers.
163. See id.
164. Many Son of Sam statutes contain provisions that permit convicted defend
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tives for publishing their stories, such as recompense or fame.
Even victims may not object to the offenders' attempts to
make money from their stories if they too can share in the financial
benefit. The victim or the victim's family are all too often aware of
the harsh reality that they can never be made "whole." At the very
least, they may find some solace in recovering money from the of
fender to pay medical expenses, lost wages, or loss of support-civil
remedies that would otherwise be unavailable to victims if the of
fender was initially without assets, and so victims chose not to pur
sue civil remedies.
In light of these policy arguments, a criminal should not be
wholly prohibited from selling his or her story. Rather, a statute
should be in place that allows offenders to sell their stories and
gives them some incentive to do so. A Son of Sam statute that gives
offenders some ability to gain financially from selling their notori
ety is one most likely to produce a published story which can bene
fit both victims and society.
Notwithstanding the arguments in favor of a Son of Sam law to
compensate victims, currently there is no Son of Sam law in Massa
chusetts. However, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office
has reviewed the case law and state responses to Simon & Schuster
and in 1999 filed revised notoriety-for-profit bills with the legisla
ture. 165 The proposed law entails various provisions designed to
meet the needs of crime victims in Massachusetts in an effective and
constitutional manner.
ants to recover a percentage of any monies received because of their notoriety if there
are no pending judgments against them after a specified period of time. These state
statutes include: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999)
(100% after five years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(c) (1995) (100% after five
years); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(d) (1997) (100% after five years); HAW. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 351-88 (Lexis 1999) (100% after ten years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(8) (West
1994) (100% after five years); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 854(e)(3)-(4) (1996 & Supp.
1999) (100% after five years); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-9(4) (1994) (court order deter
mines how much money should go to the support of minor dependents); NEB. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 81-1837 (Michie 1994) (100% after five years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22
22(F) (Michie Supp. 1999) (100% after five years); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2969.05
(West 1997) (100% after three years); OR. REv. STAT. § 147.275(6) (Supp. 1998) (100%
after five years); s.c. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1999) (100% after five
years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28A-8 (Michie 1998) (100% after five years); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-13-407(a)(1) (Supp. 1999) (100% after three years); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 7.68.240 (West 1992) (50% after five years); W. VA. CODE § 14-2B-7(d)
(Supp. 1999) (100% after three years); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(8)(b) (West 1996)
(100% after three years).
165. See S. 804, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999), amended and reintroduced as
S. 1950, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999).
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CREATING A CONSTITUTIONAL SON OF SAM LAW
FOR MASSACHUSE'ITS

The statute which contained the previous Son of Sam law,
chapter 258A of the Massachusetts General Laws, was repealed in
1994166 to make way for the new Compensation of Victims of Vio
lent Crime Act. 167 The new statute, however, did not include a re
placement notoriety-for-profit section.1 68 Presumably, this was
because the legislature knew that due to Simon & Schuster, the Son
of Sam statute as written was unconstitutional, and that a com
pletely different piece of legislation would have to be drafted. The
legislature may have expected a replacement bill to have been
drafted and passed into law before the January 1, 1995 repeal date
for chapter 258A. Indeed, a proposed Son of Sam law was filed by
the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 1994169 and 1995 170 ses
sions of the legislature. Those bills, however, were based largely on
the former New York statute and were believed to contain many
potential constitutional problems. l7l In response, the Attorney
General's Office ("AGO"), in conjunction with Massachusetts Of
fice of Victim Assistance ("MOVA"), undertook a comprehensive
analysis of Simon & Schuster and reviewed how other states had
revised their Son of Sam statutes in order to draft a suitable Son of
Sam statute for Massachusetts. Although the first bill proposed by
the AGO proved unsuccessful,l72 the AGO amended the bill and
introduced revised versions in 1999.173
A.

Senate Bill 852: "An Act Relative to the Profits from Crime"
The MOVA board approved a notoriety-for-profit bill in late

166. Chapter 258A was repealed by St.1993, ch. 478, § 3, effective Jan. 1, 1995.
See MAss. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 258A (West Supp. 1999).
167. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258C, §§ 1-13 (1998). This act created the "Victim
Bill of Rights" and reorganized the Attorney General's Office's Victim Compensation
Division and the process by which victims obtain financial relief from the state for their
crime-related injuries and lost wages.
168. See id.
169. See S. 752, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1994).
170. See S. 878, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1995).
171. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the flaws the Supreme Court found in
New York's Son of Sam statute that led to its determination that the statute was
unconstitutional.
172. See S. 852, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997).
173. See S. 804, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass 1999) (amended and reintroduced as
S. 1950, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999». The revised version of S. 804 was intro
duced on August 9, 1999. It retained all of the language found in S. 804, but added a
second section to the amendment. See infra note 190 for the language added to S. 1950.
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1996. This bill, titled "An Act Relative to Profits from Crime," was
filed with the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 1997 session
as Senate Bill 852.174 The bill required a party who contracted with
a criminal offender to submit a copy of the contract or a summary
of the terms of an oral agreement to the Division of Victim Com
pensation and Assistance ("Victim Compensation Division") within
thirty days.175 The contracting party was also obligated to remit to
the Victim Compensation Division any money or consideration
owed to the offender as a result of the agreement.n6 If a party did
not comply, the bill specified significant civil penalties.n7 The
money remitted to the Victim Compensation Division would then
be placed in an escrow fund. 178 After the account was established,
the Victim Compensation Division had thirty days to determine
whether the contract included proceeds of the crime and whether
the proceeds were "substantially related to the crime."179 The bill
further required the Victim Compensation Division to notify vic
tims of the existence of a contract with an offender either by certi
fied mail or advertisements in local publications. ISO This notice was
174. S. 852, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997). The primary sponsor of Senate
Bill 852 was the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, William R. Keating. See
id.
175. Seeid. §14(b).
176. See id.
177. See id. § 14(c). If the contracting party failed to adhere to section 14(b),
then the Division of Victim Compensation and Assistance was authorized to petition
the superior court for an order of enforcement. See id. If the court found that a con
tracting party had in fact violated subsection (b):
[T]he court shall, in addition to any other relief, impose on the contracting
party a civil penalty of the value of the contract or agreement. If the court
finds such violation to have been knowing or willful, it shall impose a civil
penalty up to three, but not less than two, times the value of the contract or
agreement.
Id.
178. See id. § 14(f). Upon a determination that a defendant had entered into a
contract agreement to receive proceeds substantially related to a crime for which he or
she had been charged or convicted (under section 14(e», the Victim Compensation
Division was authorized to "place into escrow all monies or other consideration remit
ted by the contracting party, up to the amount determined by the division to constitute"
proceeds from the crime. See id. (emphasis added). Any remaining monies or consid
eration were to be returned to the contracting party. See id.
179. Seeid. §14(e).
180. See id. § 14(d). The Victim Compensation Division had to send notification
by certified mail to the victim's last known address. See id. The Victim Compensation
Division also had to "provide legal notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county in which the crime was committed ...." Id. The Victim Compensation Division
was required to publish such a notice once every six months for one year from the date
it received the contract agreement paying a defendant money. See id. Thereafter, the
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designed to give victims another opportunity to bring a civil action
against criminal offenders.1 81 Judgments against the criminal of
fender would be satisfied from the escrow account,182 and any re
maining funds would be split between the defendant and the
Witness Assistance Fund. 183
Although this bill retained the escrow account mechanism
common in the pre-Simon & Schuster laws,184 it included several
safeguards that were intended to cure the constitutional defects
identified in Simon & Schuster. These safeguards included a provi
sion that limited the types of crimes that would trigger the law to
felonies 185 and a requirement that the law would only apply to pro
ceeds that arose from activities that were "substantially related" to
the crime for which the defendant was charged or convicted. 186
Senate Bill 852 was approved by the Judiciary Committee after
a public hearing during the spring of 1997 and was referred to the
Senate Ways and Means Committee. 187 There was a renewed inter
est in notoriety-for-profits laws during November and December
1997, due to the conviction and sentencing of Louise Woodward in
the Middlesex Superior Court.1 88 As speculation mounted that
Woodward was going to sell her story to an American publisher or
media outlet, Attorney General Harshbarger wrote to Senate Ways
and Means Chairman Stanley Rosenberg urging him to take action
on Senate Bill 852.189
However, members of the Senate Ways and Means Committee,
including Chairman Rosenberg, were concerned that Senate Bill
852 infringed upon criminals' rights to publish their stories and ex
periences. Furthermore, members of the Ways and Means Com
mittee were mindful that having money held in escrow for
Victim Compensation Division could provide additional notice as it deemed necessary.
See id.
181. See id. § 14(g). Subsection (g) gave victims three years from the time of the
last published public notice to bring civil action against a defendant for money damages.
See id.
182. See id. § 14(f).
183. See id. § 140).
184. See id. § 14(f).
185. See id. § 14(a).
186. See id. § 14(e).
187. See S. 852, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997).
188. See, e.g., Letter from Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachu
setts, to Senator Stanley Rosenberg, Chairman, Senate Ways and Means Committee
(Nov. 13, 1997) (on file with the Western New England Law Review) (discussing S. 852)
[hereinafter Letter]; Greater Boston (WGBH television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1997).
189. See, e.g., Letter, supra note 188.
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potentially many years might be considered too intrusive. Finally,
the Senate Ways and Means Committee expressed concerns about
the review process for determining what property could be seized.
These concerns mirrored the objections of Howard Kaplan
("Kaplan"), Chairman of the Trustees of the Civil Liberties Union
of Massachusetts Foundation ("CLUM"), who met with Attorney
General Harshbarger on November 26, 1997, and expressed
CLUM's opposition to any type of criminal profits law. Although
the Attorney General countered that a properly crafted bill could
provide important protection for victims without infringing on First
Amendment rights, in light of the constitutional concerns, the Sen
ate Ways and Means Committee ultimately did not bring Senate
Bill 852 to a vote during the legislative session that ended in June
1998.
The Senate Ways and Means Committee's objections
prompted further review of Senate Bill 852 by members of the
AGO in an attempt to strengthen the bill's safeguards regarding
free speech and property rights. As a result of this examination, the
Attorney General proposed several substantive changes to Senate
Bill 852.190 Most importantly, the escrow account scheme was dis
carded in favor of a system in which a party who contracts with a
criminal would be responsible for posting a bond for "proceeds"
owed to the criminal.1 91 Secondly, provisions that mandate an ad
ministrative hearing were added to give a contracting party a
greater opportunity to dispute the findings of the Victim Compen
sation Division.1 92 Finally, "substantially related to a crime" was
more fully defined within the body of the bill.1 93 The result is a
190. See S. 804, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass 1999). This new Son of Sam Amend
ment was introduced on January 6, 1999 by Senator Cheryl A. Jacques. See id. A re
vised version of this amendment was introduced by the Committee on the Judiciary on
August 9, 1999. See S. 1950, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). The revised version of
the amendment retained all of the language pertaining to section 14 from the January
1999 version. It added, however, a second section to the amendment, which states:
Section 2A of Chapter 260 of the General Laws is hereby amended by adding
after the first sentence the following language: "Actions for torts against a
criminal defendant by his victim as defined by Section 14 of Chapter 258C
shall be tolled during any period of incarceration, parole, or probation of the
defendant for the crime committed against the victim."
Id. § 2.
191. See S. 1950, § 14(c), 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass 1999).
192. See id. § 14(k). Under this subsection, a contracting party has fifteen days
from the date of the mailing of the notice to appeal to the Attorney General. See id.
Thereafter, the Attorney General must cause the Victim Compensation Division to
hold a public hearing on the Victim Compensation Division's action. See id.
193. See id. § 14(g). An activity is "substantially related to a crime" if:
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piece of legislation that attempts to address the constitutional con
cerns of CLUM and the Senate Ways and Means Committee. The
new proposal is Senate Bill 1950 and is currently pending in the
Massachusetts Legislature.
B.

Senate Bill 1950: A New Proposal

With significant changes made to address the concerns of the
Massachusetts Legislature as well as those of the United States
Supreme Court as expressed in Simon & Schuster, a new Son of
Sam bill, Senate Bill 804, was filed in December 1998. 194 This bill
was amended and reintroduced as Senate Bill 1950 in August
1999.195 The new proposal should be upheld on constitutional
grounds because it is both content-neutral and narrowly tailored to
meet the specific purpose of compensating victims.
The proposed legislation would be incorporated into the Vic
tim Compensation statute and would place control over notoriety
for-profit cases with the AGO's Division of Victim Compensation
and Assistance ("Victim Compensation Division") which adminis
ters the Victim of Violent Crimes Fund. 196 This legislatively created
fund provides awards of up to $25,000 to compensate victims of vio
lent crimes for related burial expenses, medical bills, and lost
wages. 197 This program is largely funded through assessments
against offenders who plead or are found guilty of a crime or admit
to sufficient facts for a guilty finding in the district or superior
courtS. 198 With a legal staff available to file injunctions, attach
ments, and restraining orders necessary to enforce the statute's pro
[I]t principally derives from the unique knowledge or notoriety acquired by
means and in consequence of the commission of a crime for which the defend
ant has been charged or convicted, or which the defendant has voluntarily
admitted. Activity that is tangentially related to a crime, or that contains only
a passing inference to a crime, shall not be determined to be substantially
related.
[d.

194. S. 804, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999).
195. S. 1950, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). See supra note 190 for a discus
sion of S. 1950.
196. See id. § 14(a). Past Son of Sam bills have placed responsibility for regulat
ing notoriety-for-profit actions with the Massachusetts Office of Victim Assistance
("MOVA"). See, e.g., S. 878, § 8(a), 179th Leg., 1st Annual Sess. (Mass. 1995). Section
8(a) defined "board" as "the Victim and Witness Assistance Board as established in
section four of Chapter two hundred and fifty eight B of the General Laws." See id.
197. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258C, § 3 (1998).
198. See id. ch. 258B, § 8. The amounts assessed are $35 for a misdemeanor and
not less than $60 for a felony if the offender is an adult. See id. If the offender is
adjudicated a delinquent child, the amount assessed is $30. See id. This money goes to
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visions, the Victim Compensation Division is in the best position to
regulate notoriety-for-profit cases and to identify the victims of the
related crime. Moreover, placement of the notoriety-for-profit pro
vision within a larger statute which, by its terms, is clearly designed
to compensate victims of crime, demonstrates that the primary goal
of the new law is to compensate the victims of crime, as opposed to
limiting the speech of criminals or regulating speech that relates
criminals' stories.
The proposed legislation would be triggered whenever a per
son or business, termed the "contracting party,"199 contracts with or
agrees to pay a "defendant" who is attempting to profit from past
criminal activity. A "defendant" would include those people who
have been charged with or convicted of a crime or who have volun
tarily admitted to the commission of a crime. 2OO In contrast to pre
vious under-inclusive laws that specifically targeted storytelling, the
proposed legislation includes profits gained from any use of the de
fendant's notoriety or unique knowledge gained from committing a
crime. 201 The proposed legislation's reach, however, avoids being
the Massachusetts Victim and Witness Assistance Fund. See id. Such funds are also
available to prosecutors' offices to fund victim and witness advocacy programs. See id.
199. Senate Bill 1950 defines a "contracting party" as "any person, firm, corpora
tion, partnership, association or other private legal entity which contracts for, pays, or
agrees to pay a defendant consideration which it knows or reasonably should know may
constitute proceeds from a crime." S. 1950, § 14(a). This language differs from the
earlier version, Senate Bill 852, in that "private" is inserted before "legal entity" to
exclude situations where law enforcement or the government deem it necessary to enter
into an agreement with a defendant. See S. 852, § 14(a), 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass.
1997).
200. See S. 1950, § 14(a). The proposed bill defines "defendant" as "a person
who has been charged with or convicted of a crime, or has voluntarily admitted the
commission of a crime." Id. This definition differs from Senate Bill 852 in that it in
cludes voluntary admissions in an effort to expand the number of criminal offenders
covered by the bill. See S. 852, § 14(a). The drafters were concerned with the possibil
ity that a defendant who has gained notoriety from some crimes could exploit crimes he
or she was not charged with or that could not be charged due to a statute of limitations
or grant of immunity. Thus, the proposed legislation defines "conviction" as:
[A] finding or verdict of guilty or of not guilty by reason of insanity, a plea of
guilty or a finding of sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty whether or
not final judgment or sentence is imposed, or an adjudication of delinquency
or of youthful offender status as defined in section 52 of Chapter 119.
S. 1950, § 14(a).
201. See S. 1950, § 14(a). The proposed bill defines "proceeds of the crime" as:
[A]ny assets, material objects, monies, and property obtained through the use
of unique knowledge or notoriety acquired by means and in consequence of
the commission of a crime from whatever source received by or owing to a
defendant or his representative whether earned, accrued, or paid before or
after the disposition of criminal charges against the defendant.

2000]

"SON OF SAM" LEGISLATION

35

over-inclusive by targeting only those defendants who have been
charged with, convicted of, or who have admitted to committing a
felony.202 This change meets the Supreme Court's mandate to nar
rowly tailor a Son of Sam statute by limiting its scope to people who
have committed major crimes. 203 While optimistic that Senate Bill
1950 would survive constitutional scrutiny, the AGO also included
additional provisions to ensure its effectiveness.
1.

The Reporting Requirement

The AGO has taken the position that an effective reporting
requirement is essential to any notoriety-for-profit law.204 Not only
does a reporting requirement serve to notify victims, but it permits
the AGO to monitor any action taken by either the contracting
party or the defendant to circumvent the law. The proposed legisla
tion mandates that the contracting party,2°5 rather than the defend
ant, submit to the Victim Compensation Division a copy of the
contract or a summary of the terms of an oral agreement within
Id. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the Supreme Court's discussion of under
exclusivity pertaining to New York's Son of Sam statute.
202. See S. 1950, § 14(a). The proposed bill defines "crime" from which the de
fendant has gained his notoriety as:
[A]ny violation of Massachusetts law that is punishable by imprisonment in
state prison and any federal offense committed in the Commonwealth that is
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of more than one year.
Crime shall also include any offense committed by a juvenile which would be a
crime if the juvenile were an adult.
Id. This definition parallels the definition of "felony" in chapter 90F of the Massachu
setts General Laws. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the Supreme Court's discus
sion of New York's Son of Sam statute's over-inclusive language.
203. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the narrow tailoring requirement
established by the Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster. By contrast, the previous Mas
sachusetts Son of Sam statute included all crimes. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258A,
§ 8, repealed by St.1993, ch. 478, § 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 1995). The definition for crime was "an
act committed by an adult or a juvenile in the Commonwealth which, if committed by a
mentally competent criminally responsible adult ... would constitute a crime ...." [d.
Other states have also limited the scope of their Son of Sam statutes to felonies. See,
e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(a) (McKinney 1996) (defining "crime" as "any felony
defined in the penal law"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.10(5) (West Supp. 1999) (defining
"violent crime" as "a forcible felony ... includ[ing] any other felony or aggravated mis
demeanor which involved the actual or threatened infliction of physical or emotional
injury"). See supra note 103 for a description of other states that have similarly limited
the scope of their statutes.
204. Letter from Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, to Sena
tor William Keating and Representative John Rogers (May 2, 1997) (on file with the
Western New England Law Review) (discussing Senate Bill 852).
205. For a discussion of the argument that placing the burden on the defendant to
report possible profits from selling his story might force a defendant to bear witness
against himself, see Curran v. Price, 638 A.2d 93, 106-07 (Md. 1994).
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thirty days of its execution. 206 The bill further empowers the Victim
Compensation Division to prevent any wasting of assets. Specifi
cally, the Victim Compensation Division may act on behalf of vic
tims through attachment, injunction, receivership and notice of
pendency.207
Another provision essential to an effective notoriety-for-profit
law is a clear and significant penalty for contracting parties who do
not fully report their deals with criminal offenders. If a Son of Sam
law is ignored and monies are turned over to the offender, the
money is often unrecoverable. Therefore, it is important that a Son
of Sam statute prevent such activity before it takes place. The ab
sence of a non-compliance penalty was seen as a flaw of the former
Massachusetts Son of Sam law and has also been addressed by
other states.208 The proposed legislation seeks to eliminate this
concern by providing that the Attorney General's Office may seek
an order for enforcement in the superior court.209 Furthermore, a
206. See S. 1950, § 14(b). This subsection proposes:
Any person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity
which contracts for, pays, or agrees to pay a defendant consideration which it
knows or reasonably should know may constitute proceeds of a crime shall,
within thirty days of the agreement, submit to the division a copy of its con
tract or a summary of the terms of any oral agreement.
Id. (emphasis added).
207. See S. 1950, § 14(p). This subsection proposes: "The division, acting on be
half of any victim, shall have the right to apply for any and all provisional remedies,
available under civil practice law and rules, including, but not limited to, attachment,
injunction, receivership and notice of pendency." Id.
208. For example, the revised statutes in New York, Kansas, and Colorado may
all be deficient in that they fail to provide penalties and remedies to enforce their provi
sions. See., e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-201 to 207 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 to 7321 (1992); N.Y. EXEC. LAWS § 632-a (McKinney 1996).
Several states have made failure to comply with their statute's notice and payment pro
visions either a felony or a misdemeanor. See., e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991) (fel
ony); CAL. Civ. CODE § 2225(g) (West Supp. 2000) (contempt); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 9106 (1995) (misdemeanor); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-32 (1997) (misdemeanor);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(8)(a) (West SUpp. 2000) (gross misdemeanor); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-38-11(2) (1994) (misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01(7)
(1996) (misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(A) (West Supp. 2000) (felony);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-410 (Supp. 1999) (misdemeanor); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 949.165(14) (West 1996) (misdemeanor). Other states have chosen to enforce their
statutes' notice provisions with civil penalties. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13
4202(L) (West 1989) (fine); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 351-87 (Lexis 1999) (lien); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. 346.165(6) (Michie 1997) (lien); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 854(0)
(1996 & Supp. 1999) (fine); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(A) (West Supp. 2000) (fine);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8312(g) (West 1998) (fine); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-410
(Supp. 1999) (fine); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(14) (West 1996) (fine).
209. See S. 1950, § 14(d). This subsection proposes:
If the provisions of subsections (b) or (c) are violated, the division may peti
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civil penalty may be assessed against non-complying contracting
parties equal to the value of the contract.2lO In cases where the
court finds that the violation was "knowing and willful," the penalty
may be two or three times the value of the contract.211 The size of
the potential fine should be an incentive for publishers or other
contracting parties to disclose contracts and agreements which may
be covered by the statute. Additionally, civil penalties that are col
lected will benefit victims by being deposited in the Victim Com
pensation Fund.212
Thus, the advantages of the bill's mandated full disclosure pro
. vision are twofold. The bill, if passed, will cast a wide enough net to
reach all parties who attempt to benefit from a crime without being
mindful of the victims of that crime, while allowing the Common
wealth to pass on to victims as much information as possible. By
notifying both the Victim Compensation Division and victims of the
contract terms, the offender's profits may be reached through a
court action before they are distributed and lost.
2.

Notification

The notification requirement,213 which gives victims the infor
tion the superior court for an order of enforcement. Such action shall be
brought in the county in which the contracting party resides or has his princi
ple place of business, or in Suffolk County if the contracting party does not
reside or have a principal place of business in the commonwealth. Upon a
finding that a contracting party has violated either subsections (b) or (c) the
court shall, in addition to any other relief, impose on the contracting party a
civil penalty of the value of the contract or agreement. If the court finds such
violation to have been knowing or willful, it shall impose a civil penalty up to
three, but not less than two, times the value of the contract or agreement. To
the extent monies or other consideration received by the division as a result of
such order exceed the value of the contract or agreement, they shall be depos
ited into the victim compensation fund maintained by the treasurer in accord
ance with section 4(c). Any remaining monies or consideration shall be held
by the division pending the determinations required by subsection (g).
Id.

210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. § 14(0). Subsection (0) proposes:
After all civil claims instituted by victims against the defendant have been
satisfied, or after three years of publication, if no claims have been filed, one
half of the value of the bond required in subsections (c) and (i) shall be re
turned to the contracting party. The remaining portion of the bond shall be
deposited into the victim compensation fund maintained by the treasurer in
accordance with section 4(c).
Id.

213. See id. § 14(e). This section requires that the Victim Compensation Division
notify victims by certified mail and publicize the existence of proceeds in a newspaper
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mation needed to protect their interests, is one of the most impor
tant provisions of the proposed legislation. Regardless of whether
the Victim Compensation Division determines that the money qual
ifies as "substantially related" proceeds,214 the victims may take ac
tion on their own to reach the proceeds. 215 The proposed
legislation provides victims a better chance to protect their rights by
giving victims early notice and complete information.
The proposed legislation mandates that the Victim Compensa
tion Division take reasonable steps to notify victims of the existence
of a contract to pay an offender. 216 If the offender's victims are
known, notification must be made by certified mail,217 If the iden
tity or location of victims is not known, the Victim Compensation
Division must also place notices in newspapers in the county or
counties where the crimes occurred. 218 These legal notices must be
made every six months for one year, but may continue as long as
the Victim Compensation Division deems appropriate. 219
3.

Posting a Bond

After the Victim Compensation Division has obtained the con
tract or agreement from a contracting party, the contracting party
must file a bond with the Commonwealth. 220 The Victim Compen
sation Division then must determine what part of the contract, if
any, is actually burdened by the bond requirement,221 This deter
mination consists of a two-part process. First, the Victim Compen
sation Division must determine whether the contract includes
"proceeds"; that is, whether the money or assets involved in the
contract are the result of the use of knowledge or notoriety ac
quired by the commission of a crime. 222 Second, the Victim Com
of general circulation in the county where the crime was committed-twice in the first
year after it receives the contract or agreement and thereafter as it sees fit. See id.
214. See id. § 14(g). See supra note 193 for the text of subsection (g).
215. See id. § 14(f). This section provides that victims have three years, from the
date of the last mandatory published public notice, to file a civil action to recover
money damages from a defendant. See id.
216. See id. § 14(e).
217. See id. Notification must be made by certified mail to a victim's last known
address. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. § 14(c). This bond must be "equal in amount to any proceeds of the
crime which by the terms of the contract would otherwise be owing to a defendant." Id.
221. See id. § 14(g).
222. See id. "Proceeds of the crime" is defined in section 14(a). See supra note
201 for the text of the definition of "proceeds of the crime."
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pensation Division must determine whether the proceeds are
"substantially related" to the crime. 223 Whereas "proceeds" is a
broad standard, a determination of what is "substantially related"
narrows what will be withheld from the defendant and addresses
the overbreadth problems identified by the Supreme Court in Si
mon & Schuster.224

Although the previous legislative proposal, Senate Bill 852,
mandated that the Victim Compensation Division determine which
contracts with criminal offenders were substantially related to the
crime for which they had been charged or convicted, it failed to
define "substantially related."225 Under the terms of the new bill,
an activity is "substantially related" if it "principally derives from
the unique knowledge or notoriety acquired ... [from] the commis
sion of a crime for which the defendant has been charged or con
victed, or ... has voluntarily admitted."226 The bill further states
that an activity is not substantially related if it is only tangentially
related, or contains only a passing reference, to the crime.227 The
purpose of this more detailed definition is for the proposed law to
avoid the trap of reaching work that relates to a crime in only a
remote way.228
The new statute requires the Victim Compensation Division to
determine whether to invoke the statute within thirty days of re
ceipt of the contract, again so as not to overly burden the con
tracting party's nor the offender's rights to free speech and
contract. 229 Under the proposed law, the Victim Compensation Di
vision is authorized to issue written civil investigative demands for
information to assist it in expeditiously making this deterrnina
223. See id. See supra note 193 for the text of the definition of "substantially
related."
224. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of how the Simon & Schuster Court
characterized the over-breadth problem.
225. See S. 852, § 14(e), 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997).
226. S. 1950, § 14(g).
227. See id.
228. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's finding that
over-inclusive language invalidates forfeiture statutes.
229. See S. 1950, § 14(g). This subsection proposes:
Within thirty days from the receipt of a contract or agreement, or upon its own
initiative if no contract or agreement is submitted, the division shall determine
whether the terms of the contract or agreement include proceeds of a crime as
defined in subsection (a) and, if so, whether such proceeds arise from activity
that is substantially related to a crime.
Id.
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tion.230 Once the Victim Compensation Division has determined
that all or a portion of the proceeds are substantially related to a
felony, and therefore subject to the statute, the contracting party is
notified and may be required to post a new bond. 231 The bond es
tablishes a fund which preserves the money that could potentially
be obtained by a victim through a civil judgment,232 while avoiding
the more cumbersome and intrusive escrow account procedures of
the former proposed statute. 233
4.

Administrative Review

Another significant change from Senate Bill 852 is the addition
of an explicit procedure by which a contracting party may have the
Victim Compensation Division's decision reviewed. 234 After being
notified of the Victim Compensation Division's decision,235 an ag
grieved contracting party has fifteen days to appeal for review by
the Attorney General, which includes a public hearing. 236 The re
230. See id. § 14(h). Subsection 14(h) proposes:
In order to make the determinations required by subsection (g) the division
shall be authorized to issue written civil investigative demands which may be
served by certified mail, and which shall be returned within fifteen days from
the date of service. Whenever a person fails to comply with a civil investiga
tive demand served on him pursuant to this section, the division may petition
the superior court for an order of enforcement. Such action shall be brought
in the county in which the party resides or has his principal place of business,
or in Suffolk County if the party does not reside or have a principal place of
business in the commonwealth. Failure to comply with an order entered under
this section shall be punished as a contempt of court. All information col
lected by the division pursuant to this section shall be kept in accordance with
the provisions of chapters 4, 66, and 66A.
Id.
231. See id. § 14(i). Subsection 14(i) proposes:
Upon making the determinations required by subsection (g), the Division may
continue to hold the bond filed in accordance with subsection (c), or may re
quire the contracting party to file a new bond equal to the amount determined
by the Division to constitute proceeds arising from activity that is substantially
related to a crime.
Id.
232. See id. "The bond held by the Division shall be used to satisfy, in part or in
full, any civil judgment obtained by a victim against the defendant arising from the
crime." Id.
233. See, e.g., S. 852, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997).
234. See S. 1950, § 14(k) - (T).
235. See id. § 14(j). This subsection proposes: "Within fifteen days of the deter
mination required by subsection (g), the division shall notify the contracting party of its
determinations by certified mail." Id.
236. See id. § 14(k). This subsection proposes:
Within fifteen days of the date of mailing of the notice of the division's deter
mination, a contracting party aggrieved by the division's determination may
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suIt of the review proceedings, along with information about the
contracting party's right to judicial review, must then be sent to the
contracting party by certified mail within ten days of the public
hearing. 237 If still unsatisfied, the contracting party has an addi
tional thirty days to file a complaint in the superior court. 238 Judi
cial review would then be in accordance with established
procedures for the review of administrative decisions. 239
5.

Action to Be Taken by Victims

Even after the Victim Compensation Division has received the
contract, started its review process, and notified potential victims, a
victim is not automatically entitled to the bond posted. Instead, any
victim wishing to reach the funds must bring and prevail in a civil
action against the defendant.240 However, the proposed legislation
appeal to the attorney general, by serving on the attorney general a written
notice to that effect. Thereupon the attorney general shaH immediately cause
the division or his designee to hold a public hearing on the division's action
appealed from. The division shaH notify the contracting party by certified mail
of the determination upon appeal within ten days of the closing of the hearing.
Such notice shaH include information regarding the contracting party's right to
a petition for judicial review of the determination of the division.

Id.
237. See id.
238. See id. § 14(e).
239. See id. Subsection 14(e) proposes:
Within thirty days of the date of the date of mailing of the notice of the divi
sion's determination, the contracting party may file a complaint for judicial
review in the superior court in the county in which the contracting party re
sides or has his principal place of business, or in Suffolk County if the con
tracting party does not reside or have a principal place of business in the
commonwealth. Proceedings upon any such complaint shaH be in accordance
with chapter 30A. If no petition is filed within the time specified, the decision
of the division shaH be final.

Id.
240. See id. § 14(i). This subsection proposes:
Upon making the determinations required by subsection (g), the division may
continue to hold the bond filed in accordance with subsection (c), or may re
quire the contracting party to file a new bond equal to the amount determined
by the division to constitute proceeds arising from the activity that is substan
tially related to a crime. The bond held by the division shall be used to satisfy,
in part or in full, any civil judgment obtained by a victim against the defendant
arising from the crime.
Id. (emphasis added).
In contrast, S. 852 dealt exclusively with an escrow account scheme:
Upon making the determinations required by subsection (e), the division shall
place into escrow all monies or other consideration remitted by the con
tracting party, up to the amount determined by the division to constitute pro
ceeds arising from activity that is substantiaHy related to the crime for which
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significantly expands a victim's ability to bring civil actions against
the defendant by extending the applicable statute of limitations.
Rather than limiting victims to bringing actions within six years of
being harmed, they will have the right to file suit anytime within
three years of the last published legal notice. 241
6.

Payments of Civil Judgment

If after being "fully and finally prosecuted" the defendant is
not convicted, the bond is to be returned to the contracting party.242
On the other hand, if the defendant is convicted of the crime,243 a
civil judgment obtained against him or her that arises from the
crime may be satisfied by the bond posted with the Victim Compen
sation Division. 244 After all civil judgments are satisfied, or if no
claims have been filed against the defendant or the contracting
party during the three year period after the last publication, the
remainder of the value of the bond will be split between the conthe person has been charged or convicted. Any remaining monies or consider
ation shall be returned to the contracting party. Any civil judgment against
the defendant arising from the crime shall be paid from the proceeds being
held in escrow, or from proceeds which may be received in the future.
S. 852, § 14(f), 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997).
241. See S. 1950, § 14(f). Section 14(f) proposes:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the General Laws with respect to the
timely bringing of an action, any victim shall have the right to bring a civil
action to recover money damages from a defendant or his legal representative
within three years of the last mandatory published public notice provided for
in subsection (e).
Id.
242. See id. § 14(n). This subsection proposes: "The division shall return to the
contracting party the bond required in subsections (c) and (i) if the defendant is fully
and finally prosecuted and is not convicted of the crime, or has not voluntarily admitted
the commission of the crime." Id. This does not mean, however, that victims will be
unable to obtain compensation as a result of their civil actions. Even if a defendant is
found not guilty in a criminal proceeding, he may still be found responsible for injuries
by a civil court. Although the Attorney General's role ends at this point, the notifica-·
tion process and holding period for the funds will presumably protect victims' rights to
recovery better than if there were no notoriety-for-profit legislation.
243. In addition to governing defendants who have been charged with or con
victed of a felony, the proposed legislation includes anyone who has voluntarily admit
ted to committing a felony. See id. § 14(m). The purpose of this provision is to include
people who admit and wish to profit from criminal activity, but who were not charged
with a crime. These situations may include times when the Commonwealth decides not
to prosecute or an admission by a person to the crime after the statute of limitations has
expired.
244. See id. § 14(n). "The bond required in subsections (c) and (i) shall not be
used to satisfy any civil judgment for a victim until the defendant has been fully and
finally convicted of the crime for which he has been charged or until the defendant has
voluntarily admitted the commission of the crime." Id.

2000]

"SON OF SAM" LEGISLATION

43

tracting party and the Victim Compensation Fund. 245 The defend
ant, therefore, may still profit in some way from his work, but at
least some of the money will benefit crime victims in general. This
provision serves to address Justice O'Connor's statement in Simon
& Schuster that the money in question need only benefit victims
generally, and not necessarily an actual victim: "We need only con
clude that the State has a compelling interest in depriving criminals
of the profits of their crimes, and in using these funds to compen
sate victims. "246
Finally, the proposed legislation includes a provision that pre
vents a defendant or a contracting party from side stepping or
avoiding the law. 247 Any action that would defeat the purpose of
the statute is void. 248 In particular, the provision nullifies actions
such as creating corporate entities or executing a power of attorney
in order to keep an agreement secret, in order to avoid the
processes established by the bill. 249
CONCLUSION

Despite several recent criminal cases that evidence an immedi
ate need for a law that protects the rights of crime victims in situa
tions in which criminals profit from their notoriety, Massachusetts
currently does not have a such a statute. In response, the Massa
chusetts Attorney General's Office has filed a bill with the state
245. See id. § 14(0). Section 14(0) proposes:
After all civil claims instituted by victims against the defendant have been
satisfied, or after three years of publication no claims have been filed, one-half
of the value of the bond required in subsections (c) and (i) shall be returned to
the contracting party. The remaining portion of the bond shall be deposited
into the victim compensation fund maintained by the treasurer in accordance
with section 4(c).
Id.

246. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 119 (1991). The Maryland statute reviewed in Curran v. Price also
provided that funds in escrow that were unclaimed by victims would eventually be
transferred to a general victim's compensation fund. See Curran v. Price, 638 A.2d 93,
104 (Md. 1994). The Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged that this require
ment was not narrowly tailored to ensure that a defendant not profit from the crime at
the expense of the particular crime victim, but it noted that this did not appear to be a
requirement under Simon & Schuster. See id.
247. See S. 1950, § 14(q). This subsection proposes: "Any action taken by a de
fendant, or his representative, whether by way of execution of a power of attorney,
creation of corporate entities or otherwise, to defeat the purpose of this section shall be
null and void." Id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
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legislature that has been crafted to protect victims while remaining
within the bounds of the Constitution. An "Act Relative to the
Profits from Crime" should be enacted and signed into law, once
again affirming the age-old adage that "crime does not pay."

